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Abstract: Radical constructivists appeal to self-legislation in arguing that rational
agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart
the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian
proponents are unable to defend an account of self-legislation as the fundamental
source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal
arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources
which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account
riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox
that arises when self-legislation is unable to appeal to external normative
standards. Onora O’Neill anchors self-legislation more firmly to the self-
disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend
sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These
endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self-legislation prompt a
reconstruction of a neglected realist self-legislative tradition which is exemplified
by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self-legislation,
I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and
deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can
make them our own.
I
Constructivists have adopted the Kantian motif of self-legislation in arguing that
normativity should be understood in terms of rational agency.1 The most militant
constructivists claim that all normative authority in practical reasoning is ulti-
mately self-legislated. These constructivists believe that a person can only ever
be subject to their own laws. In this article, I explore two leading accounts of
self-legislation, whilst arguing that neither can escape endemic problems gen-
erated by radical constructivist metaethical commitments. In light of these
problems, an alternative realist history of self-legislation is unearthed and
examined, which suggests self-legislation can be usefully reconceived as rational
appropriation of an already-authoritative law.
What does giving a law to oneself mean? Radical constructivists use the image
of self-legislation to illustrate the claim that legitimate authority over us must
be authorised by us. The laws to which someone is subject are to be determined
by the evaluative commitments they can or do consistently endorse from the
practical standpoint of a rational agent deciding how to act. Thus, normative
authority in practical reasoning is meant to be an authentic manifestation of
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whom and what a person is, rather than a fundamentally alien imposition. Yet,
at the same time, self-legislation promises to ground principles that can govern
and genuinely bind agents, including robust moral obligations. The result is a
modernist ethics which many will find attractive: desires, deliberations, and
social roles should be accepted as normatively binding upon agents only insofar
as they are consonant with human self-determination.
II
The resurgence of self-legislation as a metaethical concept is primarily due to the
rise of constructivism in moral and political philosophy. Contemporary construc-
tivism has its roots in John Rawls’ reading of Kant’s practical philosophy in A
Theory of Justice.2 He claims:
Kant’s main aim is to justify and deepen Rousseau’s idea that liberty is
acting in accordance with a law we give to ourselves.3
In subsequent work, Rawls avoids the language of self-legislation, talking
more often of citizens regarding themselves as ‘self-originating’ and later ‘self-
authenticating sources of valid claims’.4 Nevertheless, autonomous institution or
validation of normative authority remained a concern of his.
The Rawlsian articulation of constructivism has been even more significant for
reviving the concept of self-legislation than his explicit discussion of it. His
political constructivism aims to secure genuine objectivity for the normative
judgements which are to guide our actions; and it seeks to do this by appealing
to a valid procedure for arriving at these judgements.5 This reverses the standard
direction of justification and explanation: justified normative judgements are
now those that result from correctly following a correct procedure.6 In contrast
to ‘rational intuitionism’, the correct procedures model principles of practical
reason rather than mirror an independent moral order. The famous Rawlsian
‘original position’—which instructs us to consider what principles rational
agents behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ would choose—qualifies as such a procedure
when its results are brought into reflective equilibrium with our considered
moral judgements.
Crucially, Rawls’ political constructivism is limited in various respects. He
insists that ‘not everything can be constructed and every construction has a basis,
certain materials, as it were, from which it begins’.7 We can identify both
horizontal and vertical limits to the project. Horizontally, it is only one kind of
principle that is constructed: political principles of justice governing the basic
structure of society. Other practical or theoretical norms—such as further moral,
legal, aesthetic or scientific standards—remain unconstructed. Vertically, Rawls’
justifications do not go ‘all the way down’. The correct procedures are those
that model the principles of practical reason—which are not themselves
constructed—and furthermore they depend upon a ‘Kantian’ conception of
persons as free and equal which is itself in need of justification. The later Rawls
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decisively commits himself to a political and not metaphysical justificatory
strategy, which appeals to a conception of personhood implicit in ‘our’ public
political culture.8 Ultimately, he attempts to remain neutral about the metaphys-
ics of reason. This is so that a political liberalism based upon a constructivist
methodology can be compatible with a wide range of comprehensive doctrines
which presuppose other metanormative grounds, such as divine command
theories or rational intuitionist forms of realism.9 I shall group under the heading
‘moderate constructivism’ those positions which can be grounded in non-
constructivist accounts of normativity in this way.10
III
Among Rawls’ students, there were some who thought that constructivism
should annex more territory in practical philosophy. We face the rather unlikely
image of militant Rawlsian partisans here, who are keen to storm the fortress of
practical reason itself. These radical constructivists deny that there must be some
basic normative concepts that remain unconstructed: there are to be no lower
limits to construction. Furthermore, they push outwards beyond political justice,
constructing the normative architecture of the domains of morality and practical
reason in general.
Radical constructivists have returned to Kant for the very reason that Rawls
departs from him: the promise that fundamental ethical principles can be
constructed by autonomous agents.11 Self-legislation is one of the Kantian
resources which they use to articulate a defence of the claim that the only
intelligible ground for normative authority in practical deliberation is the
rational will’s binding of itself. Since other sources of normativity cannot be
presupposed, the radicalisation of constructivism imposes heavy explanatory
and justificatory burdens. Without the more fundamental normative substrata
which positions like metaethical realism or expressivism provide, self-legislation
must confront a paradox.12
The paradox of self-legislation arises when we ask whether legislating is
governed by antecedent norms. If there are no such norms, then self-legislation
would be blind—being no more than an ‘arbitrary self-launching’—and so unfit
to express of our freedom or ground reasons or values.13 But if self-legislation is
governed by antecedent norms, then their status remains in question, since we
can ask whether these higher-order norms are self-legislated. The inquiry can
be reiterated if these antecedent norms are also self-legislated; and for self-
legislation to begin at all, it cannot be that there is an infinite series of
antecedently self-legislated norms ‘all the way down’. But if at any stage
self-legislation must rest on non-self-legislated norms, radical constructivism
must be false as a thesis about all normative authority in practical reasoning.
Two dimensions of the paradox should be distinguished, which can be framed
by questions to a potential legislator. First, why should you self-legislate at all?14
If the only source of reasons is self-legislation, then before self-legislation is
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undertaken, there could be no reason to undertake it. Reasons to legislate which
are not somehow self-legislated would demonstrate that radical constructivism
is not a comprehensive account of normativity. Second, how should you self-
legislate? If there are already reasons that determine what we should legislate
before we do so, then the legislative process looks to be redundant and based on
non-self-legislated grounds. Whereas, if there are no such reasons, then what we
legislate is capricious—being no more than a faux-existentialist salto mortale,
which constructivists should want to reject.15 The fundamental dilemma facing
the radical constructivist is that self-legislation is either redundant or arbitrary.
IV
Consider two responses to the dilemma. Moderate constructivists are able to
accept the self-legislation of normative authorities whilst looking well-placed to
avoid both horns. This is because these constructivists can appeal to some other
norms to underpin actual or hypothetical deliberation of agents who are to give
themselves principles. The vertical limits on moderate constructivism mean that
there is no commitment to denying antecedent practical norms. Therefore,
unconstructed norms are available to motivate and shape legislation (e.g. those
incorporated in Rawls’ conception of personhood).16 Since there are reasons why
and how legislation should be undertaken, it does not have to proceed randomly,
wilfully, or unjustifiably, and so the arbitrariness horn is avoided. Secondly,
when self-legislation is embedded within a ‘device of representation’ for the
purpose of ‘public reflection and self-clarification’ concerning our existing com-
mitments, then moderate constructivists can avoid the redundancy horn.17 This
is because appeal to self-legislation would have a clarificatory role in helping to
explain the relation between agency and legitimacy, but without foregrounding
the autonomous creation of new norms in any weighty sense which subservience
of legislation to anterior normative authorities would render pointless.18
Another response to the dilemma comes from radical ‘Humean constructiv-
ism’, whose proponents think self-legislation is the ultimate source of practical
norms, yet deny that arbitrariness is a problem.19 For instance, Sharon Street
holds that reasons for action arise from the practical standpoint of agents who
legislate to themselves, whilst rejecting the Kantian claim that there must be
some reasons common to all such standpoints. Instead, practical normative
authority is simply a function of judgements a person makes on the basis of their
subjective motivational set. Minimal rational constraints arise inter-attitudinally:
what an agent legislates constrains what else they can legislate. Antinomies
cannot be legislated, for example. Thus, the requirement to both to act and not
act in a certain way is disallowed—such as, to always maximise profit and never
to extract profit from unsafe working conditions. These formal inter-attitudinal
constraints mean that legislation is not completely haphazard. However, Street
denies that there are any ‘substantive’ constraints which practical reason or any
other authority can provide to govern legislation, and she self-consciously
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embraces relativism about value.20 Unlike their Kantian cousins, Humean
constructivists do not think that self-legislation must be moral or avoid arbi-
trariness: the law is determined by what I judge, and it is my own law because
I judge it.
For radical Kantian constructivists, neither response will be sufficient. Mod-
erate constructivism is an incomplete account of practical principles that pre-
supposes an unvindicated kind of practical reasoning. Whereas radical Humean
constructivism is committed to an individualistic relativism that makes practical
reason subservient to unsupported judgements about reasons and decouples it
from moral universalism. Instead, Korsgaard and O’Neill’s radical Kantian
constructivisms hope to avoid the spectre of arbitrariness through appeal to
internal norms of self-legislation which are presupposed by the perspective of
any potential legislator. Thus, although Korsgaard recognises the threat of
‘arbitrary power’ to undermine self-legislation, and O’Neill warns of ‘anomie’
and ‘disorientated consciousness’, they are confident that the deep structure of
practical rationality can be mined for resources to guide self-legislation and stave
off arbitrariness.21 Our task will be to determine whether they succeed.
V
Korsgaard abandons Rawlsian neutrality about fundamental sources of
normativity, claiming that ‘values are created by human beings’ and this is ‘a
matter of making laws’.22 Her ambitious radical constructivist arguments have
been much-discussed, and among many targets of criticism are her transcen-
dental defence of humanity’s value, constitutivist conception of agency and
motivation, and fusion of ethical and metaethical reasoning.23 I do not want to
linger on this well-ploughed ground, so shall focus only on the most direct
threats from the paradox of self-legislation which confront her constructivism.
Korsgaard’s answer to why we should legislate for ourselves is that it solves
a problem that humans cannot escape. This problem arises from the nature of
agency, and we humans ‘are condemned to choice and action’.24 The ever-present
capacity for reflection—to ask whether there is a reason to do as we are
inclined—is meant to reveal that the self is divided. We are sundered by
self-consciousness, since awareness of potential motivations creates an inner
distance from them that precludes mere instinctive behaviour. Deliberation
attempts to reunite the self under a common purpose; and a deliberative choice
require a principle. Yet, the constitution of agency cannot begin from merely any
principle—it requires ‘not one imposed on it from outside, for it has no reason
to accept such a principle, but one that is its own’.25 Thus, self-legislation is
demanded by agency itself.
This argument for self-legislation begins from a psycho-philosophical
characterisation of agency. Action presupposes maxim-formation, through which
the will freely adopts action-guiding principles which provide it with reasons.26
Two claims concerning self-determination are introduced here: first, that the
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rational will cannot be determined by incentives which are not incorporated into
maxims it adopts; and second, that the rational will can be determined by
incentives which it does incorporate into maxims it adopts. In short, insofar as
action is necessary, the first negative claim implies the second positive claim.
Thus, if action requires principles, and you have to act, all whilst being unable
to act on principles that you do not give to yourself, then it follows you must
act on principles that you do give to yourself.27
What makes this a Kantian rather than Humean radical constructivism is the
further argument that legislators are committed to some common values, such as
the value of human rational agency itself. The argument is premised on the claim
that not all the contingent practical identities which we use to orient our
deliberation—brother, vegetarian, philosopher, and so on—can be shed without
leaving us bereft of reasons and so unable to act. In recognising this fact—that
we must value ourselves under contingent conceptions of our identity—we are
valuing something non-contingent: ourselves as rational agents. This is because
‘we are endorsing a reason that arises from our rational nature—namely our
need to have reasons’.28 This means that self-legislation cannot be entirely
arbitrary, as if subject only to inter-attitudinal constraints, because all legislators
must be committed to valuing their rational agency.
VI
The main objection to Korsgaard which I shall press concerns her denial that the
rational will can be legitimately and intelligibly subject to non-self-legislated
normative authorities. Korsgaard directs this claim against her non-constructivist
rivals. In doing so, she characterises scepticism as ‘the fear that we cannot find
what Kant called “the unconditioned” ’, namely an answer to reflective scrutiny
that ‘makes it impossible, unnecessary, or incoherent to ask why again’.29
Korsgaard wields this challenge against rival non-sceptical accounts of
normativity, claiming that ‘[t]he realist’s response is to dig in his heels’, ending
any threatened justificatory regress by fiat, through an appeal to intrinsically
normative entities.30 However, her need to hold non-constructivist competition to
such high standards redounds against her.
Kant, of course, takes the need for relentless criticism seriously, proclaiming
that, ‘Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism
everything must submit’.31 However, Korsgaard herself is ill-equipped for this
critical task. She only gives us reasons to treat some of our practical identities as
reason-giving, and this falls short as guidance to legislators given her own
strictures on reflection, on which practical reasoning requires an ‘unconditional’
answer to legitimately conclude it. For it is one thing to say that we should treat
some contingent identities as reason-giving, but another to say which we ought
to. Demonstrating why we must legislate is of limited use in determining how
to legislate.
On Korsgaard’s own demanding view, we are not to cease reflection until it
is ‘impossible, unnecessary, or incoherent’ for us to continue. But it seems
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possible, necessary, and coherent to reflect about which specific identities to
adopt, as distinct from reflecting about the necessity that, as a condition of
agency, we must adopt one or other identity.32 The paradox of self-legislation
will not be solved until we can find normative guidance for reflection at this
more fine-grained level. An agent needs some way of determining which
identities could be adopted consistently with non-arbitrary self-government: the
bare fact of our reflective endorsement of them is not enough if there are
insufficient rational constraints upon what to endorse. Korsgaard offers us no
help with this task, and her own requirements of unconditionality in reflection
make it a particularly onerous project. In this respect, she fails to dissolve the
paradox.
In response, Korsgaard might urge us to take a more variegated approach to
the vindication of practical identities. The moral law enjoins us to value
humanity, and we can distinguish three types of practical identity in relation to
this moral law: those which are permissible, impermissible, and mandatory. In
line with these distinctions, Korsgaard could say that it is only in assessing
whether an identity is morally mandatory or morally impermissible that we are
required to ask whether it would be incoherent either to adopt or not adopt it.
In between these extremes, there will be a whole raft of acceptable but discre-
tionary identities—e.g. student of German, casual acquaintance, hip-hop fan—
which would give us reasons in light of our endorsement of them and their
interaction with our other self-conceptions. To some extent these middling
identities would partake of our moral identities, because these moral identities
include the recognition that we should adopt a set of contingent self-conceptions
in navigating our lives. But it would still be coherent to reject many of these
identities, since they are not imposed directly by the moral law but only
indirectly by the need to endorse some reason-conferring outlook. The hope
would be to avoid an overly demanding set of standards for our ordinary
non-moral identities by subjecting them only to the test of moral permissibility
and consistency with our other non-moral identities. At the same time, genuinely
universal rational constraints stemming from our autonomy as agents would be
in force (in the form of moral norms), providing sufficient structure and
guidance to enable people to gain enough critical purchase on their lives to live
them independently and avoid completely capricious self-legislation.
The problem with responses of this kind is that they introduce an unstable
mix of rigorist and voluntarist elements to practical reasoning, such that the
content of the will is sovereign once the demands of morality are satisfied. The
commonest sort of critical scrutiny which we find ourselves engaging in as
practical agents does not concern morality directly. Rather, in Korsgaard’s idiom,
it will be negotiating our non-moral practical identities in determining how we
should act. This task requires people to weigh their contingently incurred
commitments, judging which are most pressing, what trade-offs must be made,
how they should go about formulating a plan of action, and so on. But when it
comes to these morally permitted but not morally mandatory matters, then the
excoriating critical force of the moral law cannot guide us.
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In the absence of the moral law, then the rational constraints on deliberation
are excessively weak. Other than mere consistency, there are slim resources for
distinguishing non-moral identities which are valuable guides from those which
can be readily discarded. Similarly, even within the set of identities we have
adopted, the same difficulty arises for determining what takes precedence as a
source of reasons in case of conflict or underdetermination. Of course, nothing
much hangs on many intentional actions, and some are perhaps not even
amenable to ratiocination or reason. It will also very often be the case that
endorsement of an action in line with our consistent desires and commitments
is all the reason we could need (e.g. deciding to act on a desire to read W.G.
Sebald during your train journey rather than Iris Murdoch is likely sufficient
reason to do so). Yet, moral necessities and consistent preference-endorsement do
not exhaust the space of practical reason. To take one kind of example, when
evaluating our character and nexus of desires as a whole—asking ourselves if we
are the sort of person we ought to be—then independently compelling political,
social, aesthetic, and intellectual considerations can legitimately sit alongside
those of morality (even if the latter are categorically binding).
When reasons give out too soon, we are left with only a quasi-rational
legislation of the will. If, within the bounds of the moral law, only our
endorsement of non-moral identities matters, then too large a part of our life is
surrendered to those conditions under which our non-moral preferences are
formed.33 This route would lead Korsgaard back towards the difficulties we met
with Humean forms of radical constructivism: practical reason is held hostage to
what we simply happen to care about rather than being able to help us work out
what that should be. There should be room for discretionary activity and
evaluation in the autonomous life, but when an account of self-legislation
threatens to deprive us of the resources to critically appraise much of the rest of
our activities and evaluations, then it fails to do justice to our autonomy as a
whole.
VII
The radical Kantian constructivism which O’Neill advances is more modest in its
aims than Korsgaard’s but promises to be more stable and better-equipped to
defuse the paradox of self-legislation. O’Neill gives a ‘constructive account of
practical reason and ethics’, yet without claiming that all values are con-
structed.34 Despite this, she is still a radical constructivist, because there are no
vertical limits to construction—it is not supported or oriented by non-
constructed laws or values.
O’Neill has a distinctive understanding of self-legislation: rather than indi-
vidual agents, reason itself figures as the legislator. Reason is self-legislative
because it derives its authority reflexively rather than from an external source.35
Nevertheless, self-legislation remains a feature of human life, as ‘the basic
characteristic of ways of thinking or willing that are conducted with sufficient
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discipline to be followable by or accessible to others’.36 Yet, unlike Korsgaard,
O’Neill is not committed to the claim that our reflective endorsement is the
source of normativity. This results in a more pronounced rationalism that chimes
with critics of Korsgaard such as G.A. Cohen, who claims that ‘it is reason as such
that is sovereign over us, and that gives determinacy, stability, and authority to
a law that would otherwise lack all that’.37
For O’Neill, reason is identified with the autonomy of thought and action.38 Its
authority consists in a form of self-discipline, following Kant’s claim that
Reason must subject itself to criticism; should it limit freedom of
criticism by any prohibitions, it must harm itself, drawing upon itself a
damaging suspicion.39
The principles of rationality are simply those accorded provisional authority
in virtue of their survival of self-criticism and dependence upon no alien
authority.40
O’Neill’s justification for self-legislation centres on the need to avoid defer-
ence and anomie in reasoning.41 Reasoning that defers to other authorities
remains merely conditional, and without vindicating its antecedents it ultimately
destroys itself, since reason’s claim to legitimacy can only ever be its own
autonomy—the ability to vindicate itself. Whereas anomic reasoning, which
defers to no other authorities but which gives itself no law either, leads to
‘incoherence and isolation’, since this reasoning is paralyzed by a lack of
structure and cannot be communicated to others.42 Therefore, without self-
legislation, reasoned thought or action cannot arise. This answers the first
problem raised by the paradox of self-legislation, namely why we should give
any sort of law to ourselves.
We must next ask how we should do so. As we have already seen, reasoners
are meant to be unable to rely upon authorities unvindicated by reason.43 O’Neill
gives this description of reason’s situation:
One corollary of refusal to bow under an alien yoke is that what count
as principles of reason cannot hinge on variable and contingent matters,
all of which, however intimately human, are alien causes.44
The negative demand to eschew alien causes can be transformed into positive
advice: the norms we adopt must hold irrespective of our contingent circum-
stances. This makes the fundamental principle of reasoned thought and action
into a form of the categorical imperative, which directs our will according to
principles that could be laws for all. Consequently, ‘ “self-legislation” is not a
mysterious phrase for describing merely arbitrary ways in which a free indi-
vidual might or might not act’; it is conformity to laws which must be ‘in
principle intelligible to others, and open to their criticism, rebuttal or reasoned
agreement’.45 Further arguments are adduced in an attempt to show that we can
get concrete practical guidance from these conditions, which prohibit activities
like direct and indirect injury, deception, and an attitude of ethical indifference.46
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VIII
Despite its attractions, O’Neill’s radical constructivism tries to do too much with
too few resources. The tools which she allows herself are an ‘empirically realistic
view of the capacities and capabilities agents have,’ alongside abstraction from
this starting point.47 This precludes building idealised models of humanity and
the human situation that are shaped by specific values. Rawls’ Kantian ideal of
the person as autonomous would count as one such idealisation which O’Neill
is unhappy with and which she rejects because it forsakes a neutral description
of agents, such that it is in fact false of some of those to whom it is meant to
apply.48 The only additional element of O’Neill’s constructivism is the construc-
tive procedure. Again, this is characterised modestly, such that it amounts to no
more than the requirement to employ ‘procedures thought to be followable by
others’.49 Any account of reason which could successfully build upon such
minimal and difficult to contest foundations would be extremely powerful.
However, I think O’Neill fails in this task.50
On O’Neill’s radical Kantian constructivist model of self-legislation, it is a
matter of combining suitable materials of construction with a constructive
procedure. For her, the materials of construction are simply empirical facts
considered under various levels of abstraction, and so in legislating action-
guiding principles, the function of the constructive procedure must be to
introduce a normative dimension to these empirical facts. This raises the
question of what justifies the constructive procedure itself. O’Neill takes the
procedure of construction to be vindicated recursively. In other words, it is
justified through its ability to meet the same standards—namely, being able to be
followed by others in thought and action—which it prescribes as a norm for
deriving other norms. This is combined with the claim that other accounts of
practical reasoning cannot meet these minimal rational standards. Her strategy
relies upon a via negativa, which seeks to rule out competing conceptions of
practical reason by demonstrating their inability to meet minimal standards of
rationality which her Kantian constructivism can.
O’Neill’s response to rival models of practical reason—teleological, instru-
mental and particularist—is instructive. All three are accused of being at worst
incomprehensible and at best conditionally reasoned (and therefore arbitrary).
For instance, teleological models of practical reason, which suppose we can
discover what is good, are ruled out because they would require contentious
metaphysical support to show that there was a non-constructed good. The
problem is located not in any substantive argument with the advocate of
teleological reason—disagreement over the plausibility of this or that metaphysi-
cal commitment—but the formal property of needing metaphysical foundations
at all. The supposed failure of teleological accounts to meet the condition of
being followable by all in thought and action is because ‘those who do not accept
the appropriate metaphysical and other arguments and positions [enabling
knowledge of the objective good] may find proposals that depend upon them at
worst incomprehensible and at best conditionally reasoned’.51 The implicit
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parallel drawn is between metaphysical argumentation and private uses of
reason in Kant’s sense.52
Given O’Neill’s modal formulation of the conditions of followability, it is
strange that here she relies on the fact that people might, but again might not,
find teleological accounts unintelligible. Why is it not enough that people could
understand such an account for it to allow teleological reason to be followable
in thought and action? Unless O’Neill shows that a requirement for such
accounts to draw upon metaphysical support makes them unintelligible in
principle for beings like us, which would be a demanding task, then disquali-
fying them on these grounds appears too hasty. However, even if objections on
the grounds of potential unintelligibility are too strong, then O’Neill could still
claim that teleological accounts are conditionally reasoned, requiring the vindi-
cation of assumptions about values or wider reality which, even if they do
happen to be true, require support from outside of reason for us to justify. On
her stringent conception of self-legislation, this would make adherents of tele-
ological reasoning heteronomous, insofar as they attempt to act upon conditions
alien to the will which give it an object, rather than allowing it to legislate for
itself on the grounds of reason.
If O’Neill’s strategy for dismissing teleological accounts of reasoning turns on
the objection that such reasoning will be conditioned, then whatever the success
of her objections to rival accounts, this introduces vulnerabilities into her own
account. Can it escape the charge of being equally conditioned? That is, does it
ground reasoning upon contingent assumptions, and so make what we have
reason to do dependent upon some further condition which may or may not
hold? I think that the demanding standards which O’Neill must introduce to
dismiss rival accounts of practical reason leave her susceptible to this objection.
Her account of reasoning and the justification of the constructive procedure is
particularly vulnerable, since it relies upon co-ordination and communication
amongst agents figuring as goals. Indeed, O’Neil’s fundamental principle of
rationality—‘to reject principles and strategies that are not followable by all’—
derives its authority as a response to an anterior ‘coordination problem’ facing
agents.53 But once her critique of rival accounts of reasoning has introduced a
prohibition on conditioned forms of reasoning, then presupposing this problem
and these goals begins to become problematic.
If co-ordination and communication are not the ends of all people, then it
seems that O’Neill’s account of reason is merely hypothetical. Given that you
want to live a life in dialogue with a plurality of people with whom you can
engage in a series of reciprocal interactions, then you ought to adopt the
principle that the maxims you adopt should be followable in thought and action
by all. This is a perfectly reasonable stretch of ordinary practical reasoning, but
will not do for a vindication of the procedure of construction (at least on the
basis that O’Neill wants). This is because it makes reason beholden to what she
has called ‘private’ authorities: those which are dependent upon us already
accepting the assumptions of some contingent set of plans, institutions, or forms
of life.
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Co-ordination and communication are goals amenable to abstract
characterisation that can demonstrate that the vast majority of people implicitly
or explicitly accept them in some form. But the radical aspirations of O’Neill’s
constructivism have seen her reject a restricted construction of normativity
which relativise the authority of reason to what a subset of people happen to
accept. All agents—or all competent and capable ones—were supposed to fall
within the bounds of reason. Yet, for all in her thought that warns against it,
O’Neill is in danger of instrumentalising reason, insofar as it is put into the service
of a positive desire to coherently interact and communicate with other people.
No doubt a human life without the implicit goal of such interaction and
communication would be paltry; but its possibility seems to demonstrate that,
for O’Neill, reasoning has a minimally hypothetical form. Therefore, by her own
lights, she ought to fall short of vindicating self-legislation.
IX
In reply, co-ordination and communication might be said not to be empirically
discernable aims of reasoners but integral goals of reasoning as such. O’Neill has
forsworn idealisation of agents—which attributes properties to them which some
do not possess—so non-empirical goals of reasoning could not be understood as
ideal goals of agents. Instead, these goals of co-ordination and communication
might be commitments which legislators incur in the totality of their willing,
akin to those which she labels ‘Principles of Rational Intending’.54 O’Neill claims
that human beings invariably have at least some projects or maxims which
cannot always be realised unaided; and this suggests that legislators always
incur commitments to goals of co-ordination and communication with others,
whether or not they actually recognise them as commitments.55 Therefore, these
goals for orienting legislation would be neither empirical nor ideal but practi-
cally necessary.
This response depends upon vindicating the claim that all rational agents
have projects which ensure that they are dependent enough on others to impose
a commitment to co-ordinate and communicate with them. Can reasoners never
adopt a self-sufficient set of maxims? This question concerns the ends of reason
as such rather than the contingent projects of actual agents. The more ambitious
claim must be defended because rational self-legislation whose stability is
dependent upon specific projects or commitments being adopted which reason-
able agents could legitimately reject would rely on conditioned reasoning. There-
fore, self-legislation must rest on claims about what all reasoners must legislate,
whatever other commitments they happen to incur. Yet, even the impressive
principles of rational intending that O’Neill amasses give no clear way to argue
that the goals of co-ordination and communication which could orient self-
legislation are sufficiently universal that they are integral to reasoning as
such. Consequently, the ambitious thesis about the ends of reason remains
undefended.56
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O’Neill’s recursive strategy for vindicating constructivist models of self-
legislative practical reasoning does not meet the challenge that she sets for rival
accounts of practical reason. She transgresses her own necessarily strict require-
ment that self-legislation be independent of conditioned forms of reasoning,
where there are no grounds for justifying genuinely practically necessary stand-
ards of reason to guide legislation. Thus, O’Neill does not escape the paradox of
self-legislation.
X
The radical Kantian constructivist accounts we have considered have failed to
offer a workable conception of self-legislation. Neither rational agents nor the
structure of rational agency itself can be the ultimate source of legislation, since
neither approach adequately accounts for the normative authority needed to
prevent legislation collapsing into caprice or other forms of arbitrariness. The
main alternative approach to self-legislation within metaethics is radical
Humean constructivism, which understands legislation relativistically. Yet, rela-
tivism about value is a high price to pay to ground normativity in human
autonomy.57 Therefore, self-legislation may seem like a moribund metaethical
concept. However, there is a neglected self-legislative tradition that predates
Kant and his constructivist readers. Unearthing and building upon this early
conception of self-legislation shows how the metaphor can be rehabilitated and
put to work outside of constructivist metaethical projects.
Thought about self-legislation can be traced at least as far back as ancient
Greek discussions of αυ´τονομι´α (autonomy). On a literal reading, to be
autonomous—‘αυ´το’ meaning self or one’s own and ‘νο´μος’ meaning law or
custom—is simply to be self-legislating, in the sense of having a law of one’s
own. The main use of ‘αυ´τονομι´α’ was in Greek political vocabulary, denoting
minor states retaining relative independence from their more powerful allies,
and who remained subject to their own laws rather than those of a foreign
power.58 However, its first extant appearance is in Sophocles, who ascribes
autonomy to an individual. The Chorus describe Antigone as autonomous in her
descent into Hades which follows the discovery of her attempted burial of her
brother. It suggests that her avowed piety in fulfilling the divine law is an act of
fidelity to a law of her own.59
Subsequently, autonomy is praised by some Greek philosophers writing under
the influence of Stoicism, such as Epictetus and Dio of Prusa.60 Autonomy is once
more understood as adhering to a law of one’s own which is also divine, eternal
and natural. The wise achieve freedom by knowing and rigidly holding to this
natural law, which allows them to escape the kind of determination by contin-
gent circumstances that chasing pleasure or status involves.61 The operative sense
of self-legislation in these attributions of individual autonomy is appropriation
of an already-authoritative law, whose content the individual does not choose or
otherwise directly determine.
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We find a Christianised version of this kind of self-legislation—as adherence to
natural law—in Aquinas’ commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. Paul
says that conscience and reason allow Gentiles to be ‘a law unto themselves’.62 On
Aquinas’ reading, this means that rational creatures are a law to themselves insofar
as they recognise the natural law.63 Guiding oneself toward this law by means of
reason is said to be ‘the highest degree of worth in human beings, namely that they
are led not by others but by themselves towards good’.64
Christian Wolff’s perfectionist articulation of the natural law tradition devel-
ops this conception of self-legislation.65 Wolff claims that reason enables us to
know a law of nature obligating us to make ourselves and others more perfect.
Echoing Paul and Aquinas, he says:
Because we know through reason what the law of nature requires, a
reasonable man needs no further law, for because of his reason he is a
law unto himself.66
On this model of self-legislation, rational cognisance of a natural law can
transform it into a law of one’s own. The rationalist foundations of self-legislation
are significant because reason is a distinctive influence upon human action that
can guide people without doing so ‘through compulsion, like a beast’.67 Further-
more, the reasonable person neither has nor needs a ‘superior’ to command them
(and so ‘becomes like God’).68 In contrast, the unreasonable person is only
motivated to do what is good out of fear of punishment or hope of reward, and
so remains in childlike submission to others. The law that the reasonable person
appropriates is normatively realist in character: it is ‘natural’ in the sense of being
‘validated by nature itself’ in contradistinction to human positive law or divine
command.69 Thus, Wolff provides a schema for understanding self-legislation
which is realist and recognises both reason’s non-coerciveness and its ability to
liberate people from subjection to the authority of others.70
XI
I have argued that radical Kantian constructivism runs aground by taking
self-legislation to be the ultimate source of normative authority in practical
reasoning. This diagnosis suggests that a viable conception of self-legislation
must abandon a radical constructivist metaethical underpinning. We have seen
that there is already a historical precedent for realist accounts. In positing
normative authorities that obtain anterior to self-legislation, then the realist has
the resources to avoid the paradox which radical constructivist metaethics
introduces. In concluding, I shall briefly outline how a rationalist and realist
approach to self-legislation might nonetheless perform analogous functions to its
radical constructivist rivals.
Consider the pitfalls of anomie and deference again, which O’Neill intends
self-legislation to overcome. The anomic agent has no authoritative structures to
govern their actions; whereas, the deferential agent is governed by alien author-
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ities. Yet, rational appropriation of independently authoritative laws, such as
ethical principles, would provide no less structure to agency than self-authored
laws. Therefore, listless or wanton anomie is avoided. Forestalling deference
presents more difficulties. Realist self-legislation does not need to directly invoke
another human or divine will in explaining normative authority or the motiva-
tion to follow laws. However, the deeper threat still concerns heteronomy: the
objection that, as practical reasoners, we would not give the law to ourselves but
find it outside of us.
How could obeying an exogenous law amount to self-determination? In reply,
we should disaggregate whether a law is alien from the source of its normative
authority. Kant himself recognises that legislators need not be originators or
authors of the law.71 To legislate is to command that a law be followed; and this
does not preclude the law arising or drawing its justification from elsewhere. In
short, legislation in which laws become one’s own is an achievement, which is
secured through sensitivity to the reasons why these laws are authoritative. This
rational self-legislation is a reckoning with normative authority rather than an
institution of it.
If one of the main functions that an account of self-legislation performs is
making sense of threats to agency which kinds of alienation impose, then this
can indicate some limits to rational self-legislation. Whether or not we rationally
legislate is only one relevant factor in determining whether a law is sufficiently
alien to make us heteronomous. On a narrow model of rationality, legislation
through cognitive acknowledgement of the reasons justifying a law needs to be
supplemented by a process of affective and volitional harmonisation with it. This
is because remaining deeply resistant to a law which we think we should act on
is a form of estrangement from ourselves.72 To prevent them remaining alien,
legislated norms would have to be integrated into our character and emotional
life. This process can reach a point where the legislative metaphor appear less
apt because a norm is no longer experienced as traditionally law-like (e.g. as a
stern imperative which categorically obliges us). Similarly, an implicitly deontic
framework might always be ill-fitting when discussing some subsets of practical
norms, such as etiquette or virtues like generosity. Nevertheless, for a significant
range of normative phenomena, realist understandings of rational self-legislation
may be able to provide a promising alternative to radical constructivist strategies
for avoiding anomie and deference in practical agency.
In gesturing towards a realist account, I have built upon a diagnosis of
constructivist attempts to exploit self-legislation. We saw how contemporary
conceptions of self-legislation have their roots in a radicalisation of the Rawlsian
project of political constructivism. In superseding Rawls, while avoiding the
relativism of their Humean cousins, radical Kantian constructivists had to show
how self-legislation could be the fundamental source of practical normativity
without collapsing into arbitrary legislation. I argued that both leading attempts
to do so founder in attempting to meet the strict success conditions their
approaches impose. Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources
which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account
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riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape the paradox
that arises when self-legislation is unable to appeal to external normative
standards. O’Neill anchors self-legislation more firmly to the self-disciplining
structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently
unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. The endemic
problems with radical constructivist models of self-legislation prompted a recon-
struction of a neglected realist tradition of which Wolff’s position presents a
paradigm example. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self-
legislation, we saw that it could also make sense of our ability to overcome
anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, we need not make laws but can
make them our own.73
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